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A SURVEY OF THE COURT ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
WILDLIFE TRADE REGULATIONS UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
JENNIFER ZOE BROOKS'
The world community recognizes international trade in wildlife as
a major concern in the struggle to save threatened or endangered species.
The wildlife trade, a large proportion of which is illegal, involves a wide
variety of plants and animal products, including live fish, shellfish,
mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds, and plants; mammal and reptile
hides; stuffed and mounted animals; and ivory products.' The declared
annual value of the legal wildlife trade at the importing stage is at least
five billion dollars.2  International trade in wildlife is clearly a big
business, especially considering that this figure should be adjusted to
account for the value of illegal trade 3 as well as a substantial markup in
retail prices. This Article will survey the judicial enforcement of wildlife
trade law against those violators who are actually caught by United States
authorities and assessed civil or criminal penalties.
I. BACKGROUND: THE STRUCTURE OF THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES
A. At the international level: CITES
In order to control the international trade in wildlife, the
international community enacted the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora4 ("CITES") in 1973. CITES
* A.B., Harvard University, 1989; M.Phil., University of Dublin, Trinity College, 1990;
J.D., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, 1993.
. Laura H. Kosloff and Mark C. Trexler, The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species: No Carrot, But Where's the Stick?, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 10222, 10223 (July 1987); Meena Alagappan, Comment, The United States'
Enforcement of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Flora and Fauna, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 541, 545 n.22 (1990).
2. Kosloff and Trexler, supra note 1, at 10223.
3. Alagappan, supra note 1, at 545 (estimating that the value of illegal wildlife trade may
exceed $100 million annually).
4. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 (1976) [hereinafter CITES).
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itself lists endangered species and divides them into three categories based
on their vulnerability to extinction.5 It then establishes requirements for
the import or export of those species.6 These requirements are intended
to ensure that any trade, whether commercial, scientific, or otherwise, in
an endangered species will not be detrimental to the survival of the
species.7
CITES includes no provisions for enforcing its requirements against
either individual violators or signatory nations. Instead, each nation is
given the job of administering the requirements of CITES through
appropriate legislation within its own legal system.' This system of self-
regulation, although necessary from the point of view of state sovereignty,
inevitably has led to relaxed CITES enforcement in many nations and
effectively has undermined the purpose of CITES. The purpose of this
Article is not to examine the worldwide effectiveness of CITES,9 however,
but rather to survey the enforcement in United States courts of the laws
regulating wildlife trade against those violators who have been
apprehended by United States authorities and face civil or criminal
liability.
B. In the United States: ESA and the Lacey Act
The United States implements CITES primarily through the
Endangered Species Act of 1973"0 ("ESA"). In addition to implementing
many other international conservation agreements, ESA prohibits trade in
5. Id. art. 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1092. These categories arc: Appendix 1, species threatened
by extinction which are or may be affected by trade; Appendix II, species whose survival
may be endangered unless trade is subject to strict regulation; and Appendix 1II, species
that have been identified by any member country as subject to protective regulations
within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing exploitation. Id. apps. 1-3, 27 U.S.T.
at 1118-43.
6. Id. art. 3-7, 27 U.S.T. at 1093-1101.
7. See id.
8. Id. art. 8, 27 U.S.T. at 1090.
9. A number of articles have discussed the general effectiveness of CITES. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. I
(1990) (concluding that CITES has proven ineffective in protecting the elephant; Kosloff
and Trexler, supra note I (concluding that the United States has successfully created the
infrastructure for implementation of CITES but that other countries with more limited
resources may not be quick to follow).
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
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violation of CITES and charges the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS") with administering, and enforcing its provisions.
Regulation by the United States of trade in wildlife is not limited to ESA.
The Lacey Act," which prohibits wildlife trade in violation of any
foreign law or any treaty signed by the United States, 2 has significantly
enhanced United States regulation of illegal wildlife trade. Although the
Lacey Act actually predates CITES, Congress considerably expanded the
Act in 1981."3 Federal statutes dealing with customs regulation have also
been used to take action against illegal traders in wildlife."4
Relatively stringent penalties, both criminal and civil, for illegal
trade in wildlife have been available under both ESA' 5 and the expanded
Lacey Act' 6 for years. However, ever since the courts began looking at
the penalties available under these statutes, the relatively light penalty of
forfeiture of contraband wildlife has proved far more popular than the
various fines and possible prison sentence also available. Of course, the
standards of liability for these penalties also vary.. The popularity of
forfeiture may result from the ease with which one can prove its
prerequisite. The penalty of forfeiture, under both ESA and the Lacey Act,
requires only that the wildlife be contraband. 7 The owner of the wildlife
need not be aware of the illegality.' 8 As courts have interpreted this
provision, the government does not even bear the burden of proof at
trial.' 9 Rather, the government must demonstrate probable cause to
believe the wildlife illegal.20 The burden then shifts to the claimant to
prove that the wildlife was, in fact, legal.2' Under the Lacey Act, the
11. Id. §§ 3371-3378.
12. Id. § 3372(a)(1).
13. Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-79, 95 Stat. 1073.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Fifty-Three Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1982)
(allowing a forfeiture under the Tariff Act of 1930 § 527, 19 U.S.C. § 1527 (1988), which
provides for the forfeiture of any mammal or bird unlawfully imported into the United
States).
15. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a), (b), (e)(4)(A)-(B) (1988).
16. See id. §§ 3373(a), (d), 3374(a).
17. Id. §§ 1540(e)(4)(A) (ESA forfeiture provision), 3374(a)(1) (Lacey Act forfeiture
provision).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., United States v. 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets, 689 F. Supp. 1106,
1113 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
20. Id.
21. Id.
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only other civil penalty is a $10,000 fine for negligent violation.22 A fine
of up to $20,000 and imprisonment for up to five years are available for
criminal violations, and therefore require a higher state of knowledge.23
ESA does include strict liability civil fines of up to $10,000 per
violation for a wildlife dealer and up to $500 per violation for others.'
One would imagine that these fines would be as popular with the courts
as the strict liability forfeiture provisions. ESA, however, seems to be less
widely used by courts than the Lacey Act in the prevention of illegal
wildlife trade. It is not clear whether this apparent preference for the
Lacey Act is merely an oversight on the part of the courts, and perhaps the
government's attorneys in prosecuting these cases, or whether courts find
it easier to determine violations of foreign law under the Lacey Act rather
than violations of CITES under ESA.
II. APPLYING CUSTOMS LAW, ESA, AND THE LACEY ACT25
A. Civil actions
1. The rise of ESA and the Lacey Act
Before the courts began using the Lacey Act or ESA to penalize
traders of illegal wildlife, they predicated forfeitures and other remedies on
violations of customs laws. In United States v. Fifty-Three Eclectus
Parrots,26 for instance, the government brought a forfeiture action under
the Tariff Act of 1930.27 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, rejecting the "innocent owner" defense, found that forfeiture
of illegally imported birds did not depend upon the presence or absence of
culpability on the part of the owner.28 It also noted that the owner had
the affirmative burden of ensuring, through appropriate documentation, that
22. 16 U.S.C. § 3373(a) (1988).
23. See id. § 3373(d).
24. Id. § 1540(a).
25. The case law dealing with illegal wildlife trade covers both civil and criminal
matters. Although the issues raised by the two types of cases sometimes overlap, they
differ in large part and -'ill therefore be discussed separately.
26. 685 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1982).
27. 19 U.S.C. § 1527 (1988).
28. Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d at 1134.
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foreign wildlife laws had not been violated.29  The court's reasoning
parallels that used in forfeiture actions under ESA and the Lacey Act.
In the mid-1980s, a pair of forfeiture cases from the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida" found liability under
ESA, CITES, and the Lacey Act. These two cases led the way to a
nationwide increase in the use by courts of the Lacey Act, and to a lesser
extent ESA, in enforcing the laws of wildlife trade. In articles dealing
with CITES, authors have voluminously cited United States v. 3,210
Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus3 and United States v. 2,507 Live
Canary Winged Parakeets,32 because until recently these cases have been
the only examples of United States court enforcement of the international
agreement. 33  This broad exposure, particularly of the earlier case,
Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus, seems to have made other courts
more aware of the laws regulating the international wildlife trade and more
willing to use those laws in their own districts. The fact that almost every
later decision involving forfeiture under the Lacey Act or ESA has cited
these two cases, as well as Eclectus Parrots, indicates the influence that
they have had?3
That the district court in southern Florida initiated this trend is
perhaps not surprising. Both Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus and Live
Canary Winged Parakeets dealt with interpretation of South American
law 35 and forfeiture procedures. The southern Florida court's experience
with forfeiture in the context of the drug trade, and perhaps the court's
cultural proximity to South America, qualified that court particularly to
take an important step in furthering the use and enforcement of ESA,
CITES, and the Lacey Act.
In Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus the government brought a
forfeiture action under CITES, ESA, and the Lacey Act against crocodile
hides found on a flight from Bolivia to Paris, which made an unscheduled
29. Id. at 1133-34.
30. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
31. 636 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
32. 689 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
33. See, e.g., Kosloff and Trexler, supra note 1, at 10233-34 nn. 158-62.
34. E.g., United States v. One Afghan Urial Ovis Orientalis Blanfordi Fully Mounted
Sheep, 964 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. 1,000 Raw Skins of Caiman
Crocodilus Yacare, No. CV-88-3476, 1991 WL 41774 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1991).
35. See Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus, 636 F. Supp. at 1286 (finding violation of
Bolivian law); Live Canary Winged Parakeets, 689 F. Supp. at 1113-14 (interpreting a
Peruvian Supreme Decree).
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landing in Miami.36 After finding that an unscheduled landing constituted
an importation under United States customs law, the court found probable
cause to believe that CITES, ESA, and the Lacey Act had all been
violated.17 Specifically, the court found probable cause to believe that the
imported hides were actually Caiman crocodilus yacare, an endangered
species, not Caiman crocodilus crocodilus, as the documentation claimed,
and thus were subject to forfeiture under ESA.38 Probable cause existed
to believe that the hides were imported in violation of CITES because the
permit accompanying the hides was not an original, as required, but an
unendorsed photocopy.3 9 Also, the permit only purported to cover 3,210
of the 7,665 hides.40 As to the Lacey Act, the court found probable cause
to believe that a Bolivian law prohibiting the hunting of undersized caiman
had been violated,, and thus that the Lacey Act had been violated.4
Rejecting the innocent owner defense, the court decided that the entire
shipment of hides, not just the number of hides in excess of the permit,
was subject to forfeiture.42
Neither the court nor the government made any attempt in.this case
to apply penalties other than forfeiture of the contraband wildlife. The
case is nevertheless remarkable for its boldness in delving into Bolivian
law, an international convention, and herpetology 43 all at once. Thanks
to the widespread mention of this decision in journals and then in later
cases, courts that may have been nervous about both looking to foreign
law and distinguishing between the remains of nearly identical species now
had a precedent.
The same court in United States v. 2,507 Live Canary Winged
Parakeets" again used CITES, ESA, and the Lacey Act together, In this
case, the bird importer actually had a CITES permit signed by the Peruvian
Director of the Department of Forest and Fauna.4 5 However, the court
found that Peruvian law prohibits exportation from anywhere in Peru of
live wild animals native to forest or jungle regions, and that the species
36. Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus, 636 F. Supp. at 1282-84.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1284.
39. Id. at 1285.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1285-86
42. Id. at 1286-87
43. Herpetology is a branch of zoology that focuses on reptiles and amphibians.
44. 689 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
45. See id. at 1109-10.
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exported, Brotogeris versicolorus, inhabits those regions. 46 Therefore, the
Director had no authority to sign the permit, and his doing so did not make
the exportation legal.47 Because the permit was invalid, and obtained in
contravention of Peruvian law, the importer had violated the Lacey Act,
ESA, and CITES.
43
Even though the owner of the birds had obtained an apparently
valid permit, the court once again rejected the "innocent owner"
defense.49 It stated that an animal importer has a duty to investigate the
legality of a shipment.50 The importer thus cannot avoid the penalty for
noncompliance by claiming that compliance was uneconomical or
inconvenient.5'
The court in Live Canary Winged Parakeets demanded a greater
showing from the importer in order to sustain the legality of his
international wildlife transaction than it did in Crusted Sides of Caiman
Crocodilus. The court refused to accept the imprimatur of the very
Peruvian official charged with determining the legality of exports of Peru.
Instead, it looked further into the written Peruvian law to determine the
legality of the official's decision. Although the court in this case once
again did not assess a penalty beyond forfeiture, it did strengthen the
precedent set by Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus by closely analyzing
foreign law in order to determine whether a violation had occurred under
the Lacey Act, ESA, or CITES.
2. Rebuffed constitutional challenges
Claimants in Lacey Act and ESA cases have argued that the
incorporation of foreign law is unconstitutional, either because it gives the
government officials unlimited discretion in violation due process 2 or it
makes the law unconstitutionally vague.53 However, these challenges
46. Id. at 1110.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1113-15.
49. Id. at 1117-19.
50. Id. at 1119.
51. Id.
52. E.g., United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824, 829-30 (9th Cir.
1989).
53. E.g., United States v. 1,000 Raw Skins of Caiman Crocodilus Yacare, No. CV-88-
3476, 1991 WL 41774, at *14-16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1991).
1993]
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have not found favor in the courts.
The Ninth Circuit has held in United States v. 594,464 Pounds of
Salmon- that the Lacey Act does not unconstitutionally permit
government agents unfettered discretion due to its prohibition against
importation of wildlife in violation of foreign law." The court reasoned
that the government official responsible for enforcing the Lacey Act
merely looks to foreign law to determine whether the statutory provisions
of the Act have been triggered.56 Therefore the Act neither assimilates
foreign law into federal law nor gives unlimited discretion in violation of
due process.
In United States v. 1,000 Raw Skins of Caiman Crocodilus
Yacare," a district court in New York considered whether ESA was
unconstitutionally vague insofar as it incorporated CITES, because of the
difficulty in distinguishing between the endangered Caiman crocodilus
yacare and the legally importable Caiman crocodilus crocodilus.59 The
court found that the law was clear in banning trade in Caiman crocodilus
yacare. The difficulty of making the correct factual determination did not
excuse the claimant's alleged mistake of fact. 60
3. The use of foreign law and CITES in applying the Lacey Act
and ESA
a. The Lacey Act
It was perhaps disingenuous of the court in United States v.
594,464 Pounds of Salmon6' to imply that the Lacey Act did not
54. 871 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1989).
55. Id. at 829-30.
56. Id. at 830.
57. Id.
58. No. CV-88-3476, 1991 WL 41774 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1991).
59. Id. at *14.
60. Id. at *15. The court cited Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1981)
for the principle that a less strict vagueness test is to be applied to economic regulation,
because businesses can be expected to consult relevant legislation, and make inquiries
when a clarification of meaning is necessary. Raw Skins of Caiman Crocodilus Yacare,
1991 WL 41774, at * 15-16. In this case, the court suggested that an importer who knows
in advance that the import of certain skins is prohibited can make inquiries as to the
nature of those skins. Id. at * 16.
61. 871 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1989).
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assimilate foreign law because it merely required a government
enforcement official to mechanically check the importer's conduct against
established foreign law. Characterization of this action as non-
discretionary becomes suspect when one considers that in the very same
opinion the court needed to engage in a discussion of the legislative
history of the Lacey Act to determine if the Taiwanese regulation in
question was captured by the phrase "any foreign law." 62 This discussion
indicates that the court itself did not see the foreign law as something not
potentially subject to ambiguities.
Indeed, courts in other circuits have used a great deal of freedom
in their interpretations of foreign law under the Lacey Act. United States
v. 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets63 provides an example of a court
using its own interpretation of Peruvian law to discredit the authorization
of an export permit by the Peruvian official responsible for such
authorization.6' In a recent Fifth Circuit case, the court took a similar
approach when it interpreted Pakistani law to uphold.a forfeiture under the
Lacey Act.65 Citing Live Canary Winged Parakeets, the court found that
an export permit issued by the Pakistani province of Baluchistan only
allowed the defendant sheep to be removed from Baluchistan, not from
Pakistan, because its removal from Pakistan would violate Pakistani
law." The district court for south Florida has even used a Bahamian law
that arguably conflicted with a United States law to trigger the Lacey Act's
criminal penalties.67
62. 871 F.2d at 826-28. The court held that a Taiwanese regulation constitutes foreign
law within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 828; see 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (1988).
63. 689 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
64. ld. at 1114.
65. United States v. One Afghan Urial Ovis Orientalis Blanfordi Fully Mounted Sheep,
964 F.2d 474, 477-78 (5th Cir. 1992).
66. Id. at 477.
67. See United States v. Shelhammer, 681 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla. 1988). The
defendants, who had violated Bahamian law by fishing within the 200-mile Bahamian
Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") without a permit, argued that the United States did not
recognize the Bahamian EEZ according to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988). The relevant section of the Magnuson
Act reads:
(e) Nonrecognition
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b. ESA
Determining a violation of CITES, and thereby of ESA, tends to be
a fairly straightforward procedure for courts. In United States v. 1,000
Raw Skins of Caiman Crocodilus Yacare,68 for instance, skins of Caiman
crocodilus yacare were listed on an accompanying CITES permit as
Caiman crocodilus crocodilus. The permit also listed Colombia as the
country of origin although the species was not found in Colombia.69
Because a CITES permit must state the correct scientific name of the
species and the correct country of origin, the facts clearly established a
violation of CITES and thus of ESA.70
4. The popularity of forfeiture under the Lacey Act and ESA
The foregoing cases illustrate that the forfeiture provisions of the
Lacey Act and ESA have become popular remedies with courts around the
It is the sense of Congress that the United States shall not recognize the
claim .of any foreign nation to a fishery conservation zone (or the
equivalent) beyond such nation's territorial sea, to the extent that such
sea is recognized by the United States, if such nation -- (1) fails to
consider and take into account traditional fishing activity of fishing
vessels of the United States; (2) fails to recognize and accept that highly
migratory species are to be managed by applicable international fishing
agreements, whether or not such nation is a party to any such
agreement; or (3) imposes on fishing vessels of the United States any
conditions or restrictions which are unrelated to fishery conservation and
management.
16 U.S.C. § 1822(e) (1988).
The court held that the government was not prohibited by the Magnuson Act
from enforcing Bahamian law because the Magnuson Act provided advice as to what
factors should be considered by the government in evaluating a foreign nation's claim to
an EEZ, rather than a congressional prohibition on governmental recognition of any
foreign nation's EEZ. Shelhammer, 681 F. Supp. at 820. Although some portions of the
Bahamian EEZ were contested by the United States, the government's assertion that the
particular area in question was recognized by the United states was accepted by the court.
Id.
68. No. CV-88-3476, 1191 WL 41774 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1991).
69. Id. at *10.
70. Id. at *9-10.
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nation. Failure to uphold a forfeiture by the government is a rarity.
The popularity of forfeiture may reflect the relative unpopularity of the
claimants. The cases discussed above have all involved import of wildlife
or wildlife products by commercial importers, commercial fishermen, or,
in one instance, a big game hunter. None of these activities was
particularly beneficial to wildlife even when conducted legally, and the
claimants in several of these cases appear to have gone through elaborate
procedures to avoid the law.72 The courts may not have had much
sympathy for these claimants.
5. Enforcing CITES and ESA against a non-profit zoo
Even one who trades in wildlife for conservationist purposes is not
immune from any penalty for the violation of wildlife trade, however. In
World Wildlife Fund v. Hodel" the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia used ESA and CITES to prohibit a zoo from charging
a fee to patrons for viewing its imported pandas. The Toledo Zoo had
applied for, and been granted, a permit from FWS to import two giant
pandas from the People's Republic of China for a temporary exhibition.
In exchange for the Chinese government's loan of the pandas, the zoo
promised at least $300,000 in equipment and vehicles and a future joint
venture with a Chinese panda reserve. 7' The zoo expected to increase its
profits during the panda exchange, through both increased attendance and
the sale of panda souvenirs, and planned to use the extra money toward
71. In United States v. One Bell Jet Ranger II Helicopter, 943 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1991),
the occupants of a helicopter had harassed bighorn sheep in violation of the Airborne
Hunting Act, see 16 U.S.C. § 742j-l(a)(2) (1988), and the Lacey Act Amendments of
1981, see 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (1988). The Ninth Circuit found that the district
court had not abused its discretion in denying the forfeiture because of several procedural
violations by the government. Id. at 1126-27. At most, this decision seems to imply that
there is some limit to the use of forfeiture.
72. See, e.g., 1,000 Raw Skins of Caiman Crocodilus Yacare, No. CV-88-3476, 1991 WL
41774 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1991) (wrong country of origin listed and species misidentified
as a non-endangered species); United States v. 3,210 Crusted Sides of Caiman Crocodilus,
636 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (permit was unendorsed and purported to cover fewer
than half the hides being shipped).
73. No. 88-1267, 1988 WL 66193 (D.D.C. 1988).
74. Id. at 1.
75. Id.
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improvements in its prirmate display.76 To advertise the exhibit, the zoo
sent out mass mailings and participated in joint promotions with Pepsi and
grocery store chains."
Giant pandas are listed in Appendix I of CITES and their
international trade therefore is regulated strictly.78  To meet the
requirements for CITES, which must be met before a permit may be issued
by FWS, the importer must establish that the import will not be for
purposes detrimental to the survival of the species; that the recipient of the
specimen is suitably prepared to house and care for the animals; and that
the specimen will not be used for primarily commercial purposes. 79 The
World Wildlife Fund ("WWF") brought suit seeking a preliminary
injunction against the zoo to prevent the zoo from continuing the panda
exhibition. WWF challenged FWS's findings that the import would not
be detrimental to the survival of the species and that the pandas would not
be used primarily for commercial purposes.8"
The two borrowed pandas came from a breeding program in China
and the male was the only proven breeder in the program.8 FWS's
stated reasons for finding that the loan would not endanger the success of
the breeding program were that "one might conclude that the Chinese
consider this animal as non-reproductive since that is the type of animal
that the applicant requested. In addition, the female may be past the
breeding period for this year and the short-term loan does not extend into
the next breeding season."82 Despite FWS's tepid and speculative support
for the harmlessness of the loan to the breeding program, and WWF's
evidence as to the difficulty of breeding giant pandas in general and the
breeding potential of the particular pandas at issue, the court decided that
WWF had not shown a substantial likelihood of success in proving that
FWS's finding regarding the detrimental effect was arbitrary and
capricious. 3  The standard for granting a preliminary injunction,
combined with the standard for reversing an agency action, severely
76. Kevin D. Hill, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species:
Fifteen Years Later, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 231, 251 (1990) (citing TOLEDO
BLADE, May 24, 1988, at 7).
77. Id. at 254.
78. World Wildlife Fund, 1988 WL 66193, at *2.
79. Id. at *2 (citing CITES, supra note 3, art. 3, 1 3, 27 U.S.T. 1093-94).
80. Id. at *3.
81. Hill, supra note 76, at 252-53.
82. World Wildlife Fund, 1988 WL 66193, at *3.
83. Id.
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handicapped the plaintiff's case.
On the issue of commercial purpose, however, the court did find
that WWF had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success in proving
the agency action to be arbitrary and capricious.8 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on the lack of any FWS explanation for its
finding as to commercial nature, the lack of any evidence that FWS ever
considered the commercial nature of the zoo's exhibition, and the
additional fee which the zoo was in fact charging to view the. pandas.85
The court went on to decide that WWF would not suffer irreparable harm
if the injunction were not granted, but that the public interest supported the
grant of the injunction." The court enjoined the zoo from charging .an
extra fee to view the pandas, but permitted the exhibition itself to
continue.'
The limited remedy that the court actually granted should not
obscure WWF's striking success in this case. Here, the court brought
CITES regulations to bear against a non-profit zoo that had complied with
the law in its import of the pandas, even when a stringent standard of
review favored the zoo's position. As a result of this case, FWS revised
its panda permit policy to incorporate WWF's objections,"8 and China
announced that it would no longer loan giant pandas or endangered golden
monkeys to the United States.89 This panda controversy may also result
in a greater awareness of the requirements of CITES on the part of zoos
and other non-profit organizations that deal with imported wildlife. They
should take note that they, too, may be challenged successfully for a less
than strict compliance with the requirements of CITES, through ESA, and
possibly also the Lacey Act or other conservation legislation.
B. Criminal Cases
1. Rebuffed constitutional challenges
Defendants in criminal prosecutions have argued that the Lacey Act
84. Id. at *4.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *4-5.
87. Id. at *5.
88. Hill, supra note 76, at 255-56 n.158.
89. Id. at 255 n.158.
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violates constitutional principles. As with their civil counterparts,
criminal defendants have been uniformly unsuccessful with this attack. In
United States v. Lee,90 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the Lacey Act does not unconstitutionally delegate
legislative power through reference to foreign law.9' The court also
resolved a due process argument in favor of the government by finding
that the Act was sufficiently clear to provide warning that it proscribed
violations of a Taiwanese regulation regarding wildlife taking.'
In United States v. Stenberg,93 the Ninth Circuit was faced with
a constitutional challenge based on vagueness. In response, the court
stated: "The Lacey Act clearly notifies individuals that participation in
prohibited transactions involving wildlife with a market value greater than
$350 subjects them to felony prosecution."" With this somewhat circular
reasoning, the court concluded that the Act was not unconstitutionally
vague.9"
2. Judicial interpretation of "knowing violation"
Even though the Lacey Act requires a knowing violation for
criminal penalties to apply, the defendant cannot always escape liability by
showing that she obtained the proper permits for a transfer of wildlife. In
United States v. Doyle,9' the defendant possessed a permit issued by the
proper state agency authorizing him to transfer falcons.' The United
States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit found the evidence sufficient to
sustain a conviction because the defendant knew that the origin of the
falcons had been misrepresented and he was aware that the transaction
90. 937 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 977 (1992).
91. Id. at 1393-94; accord United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the Lacey Act does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power).
92. Id. at 1395. The court pointed out that the Lacey Act requires that such a violation
be knowing. Thus, "the culpable intent requirements [of the Lacey Act] eliminate the
chance that criminal punishment will be imposed on one who violates the Act as a result
of having no English translation [of the underlying foreign law]." Id.
93. 803 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1986).
94. Id. at 434.
95. Id.; see also United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824 (9t Cir.
1989) (stating generally that the scienter requirement of the Lacey Act tends to mitigate
its potential vagueness).
96. 786 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 1441, 1443.
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violated Montana law.98
The Ninth Circuit expanded criminal liability under the Lacey Act
in United States v. Lee," in which the court held fishermen who
participated in the import of salmon liable under the Act." Although
some of the fishermen subject to criminal penalties did not actually violate
the regulation in question, the court reasoned that they either knew or
should have known that the salmon had been taken in violation of a
Taiwanese regulation."' 1 The court clarified that the Lacey Act punishes
the importing of wildlife taken in violation of foreign law and not
necessarily the actual violation of the foreign law. 2 Although the
Taiwanese regulation itself did not provide for any criminal sanctions, the
participating fishermen were held criminally liable under the Lacey
Act.103
For cases brought under ESA, similar constructions apply. For
example, in United States v. Ivey °4 the Fifth Circuit concluded that
knowledge of ESA's provisions is not an element of any criminal violation
of ESA.'05
3. Using the Lacey Act to impose stricter penalties than allowable
under other underlying United States statutes
Courts have used the Lacey Act to impose stricter penalties than
those mandated by the underlying law that had been violated. United
States v. Cameron"° involved a violation of regulations promulgated by
the International Pacific Halibut Commission pursuant to an international
fishing treaty between the United States and Canada."° Because these
regulations had been incorporated into United States law via the Northern
98. Id. at 1443.
99. 937 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 977 (1992).
100. Id. at 1390.
101. Id. at 1393.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1392-93.
104. 949 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (1992).
105. Id. at 766.
106. 888 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1989).
107. Id. at 1280 (citing Protocol Amending the Convention for the Preservation of the
Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, United States-Canada,
Mar. 29, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 2483 (1981)).
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Pacific Halibut Act of 1982,'08 the defendant argued that the Lacey Act
and the Halibut Act governed the same conduct. The defendant urged that
the Halibut Act should therefore take precedence over the Lacey Act.1°9
The Halibut Act does not criminalize the shipment, transportation, or sale
of halibut taken in violation of the Act or any regulation passed pursuant
to it, but instead provides for civil penalties."0 From this, defendant
argued that Congress intended the shipment, transportation, or sale of
halibut to be free of criminal consequences"'
The court rejected this argument on two grounds.' First, the
court noted that the amended Lacey Act predated the Halibut Act, and
therefore Congress could have exempted the Halibut Act from enforcement
under the Lacey Act if that had been its intention.13 Second, the court
pointed out that the penalties for taking halibut under the Halibut Act were
based on strict liability, while the criminal penalties under the Lacey Act
depended on scienter or knowledge." 4  It would be reasonable to
suppose that Congress had intended the less severe civil penalties of the
Halibut Act to accompany the less culpable offense of taking halibut
without knowledge."' In rejecting the defendant's argument that the
Lacey Act only comes into play when the underlying statute has weak
enforcement provisions, the court also cited Congress' failure to exempt
the Halibut Act from the Lacey Act's criminal penalties."
6
The court also interpreted the disclaimer provision of the Lacey Act
so as not to prevent Lacey Act prosecution based on an underlying federal
statute."' In doing so, the court looked at the congressional intent to
strengthen and support existing wildlife laws which lay behind the Lacey
Act... It decided that to fulfill that purpose the Act had to be applied
to conduct that was already regulated by an existing treaty, state or federal
108. 16 U.S.C. §§ 773-773k (1988).
109. Cameron, 888 F.2d at 1282.
110. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 773(e)(a)(5), (f)(a) (1988)).
111. Id. at 1282.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1282-83.
117. Id. at 1283-84. The disclaimer provision reads, "Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed as... repealing, superceding, or modifying any provision of Federal law ...
." 16 U.S.C. § 3378 (1988).
118. Id. at 1284.
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law, regulation, or tribal law." 9  This reading of the disclaimer
provision, which applies only to federal laws and not to treaties or state
laws, narrows the potential use of the disclaimer by defendants.
4. Liability under amendments to CITES that occurred after
implementation
In United States v. Ivey,' 20 the defendant argued that his
conviction under ESA of conspiracy to buy illegally imported Mexican
bobcat hides was invalid because amendments to CITES including bobcats
within its protection were not added until after the implementation of
CITES through ESA.' 2' The court agreed with the defendant that CITES
is not self-executing,' but held that once CITES had been implemented
in the United States by ESA, amendments to CITES that added species to
its protection were enforceable under ESA.' 23
5. Unique sentencing considerations
The criminal Lacey Act cases discuss several factors that a court
may need to consider in sentencing after a conviction has been obtained.
Although many of these factors, of course, are universal to criminal
cases,124 some special considerations exist.
In United States v. Asper" the court looked at factors unique to
the Lacey Act or ESA in examining the effect of the commercial context
of illegal wildlife trade on sentencing. The defendant claimed that his
for-profit museum, for which the contraband body parts of endangered
119. Id. at 1283-84 (citing COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WLDLiFE LAW, S. REP. No. 123,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,4, reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1751). The court drew its reasoning by analogy from its earlier
decision in United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816 (9h Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
906 (1986) (Native American prosecuted under the Lacey Act for violations of tribal
fishing laws).
120. 949 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (1992).
121. Id. at 763-64.
122. Id. at 764.
123. Id. at 764-65.
124. E.g., United States v. Brummett, 947 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1991) opinion available on
Westlaw, DCTR database (increasing defendant's offense level due to defendant's
aggravating role in a conspiracy to traffic illegally in cactus plants).
125. 753 F. Supp. 1260 (M.D. Pa. 1990), affd, 941 F.2d 1203 (3rd Cir. 1991).
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species had been intended, did not create a commercial purpose which
would increase his offense level because the venture operated at a loss.'"
The court rejected the argument and found that a commercial purpose was
involved.I The court then needed to determine whether the offense
level was subject to further increase based on the value of the wildlife.
Unfortunately, no market existed for the wildlife at issue." The court
decided that it could consider the appraisal of taxidermists because there
was no fair market value available. 2 9 The court deemed the substantial
nature of defendant's conduct an alternative ground for increasing his
sentence.'" Defendant had killed a large male Jentink's duiker, only one
to two hundred of which existed at the time in the wild.'
III. CONCLUSION
In the past few years, the volume of both criminal and civil cases
under the Lacey Act and ESA have increased dramatically. Courts have
interpreted these laws to maximize the number of violators punished. This
indicates that the courts of the United States are now aware of these laws
and are willing to use them whenever FWS discovers a violation of CITES
or the wildlife laws of the United States or any foreign country.
The United States represents a significant enough portion of the
world wildlife trade 32 that increasingly strict United States enforcement
of CITES and other wildlife laws may have a noticeable effect on the
illegal wildlife trade. Of course, the government, as represented by FWS,
still falls very short of actually detecting enough wildlife violations to
make a serious dent in the illegal trade. Even with a limited number of
cases actually reaching the courts, though, the high visibility of a case such
126. Id. at 1280.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1281.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1282.
131. Id.
132. Of the at least five billion dollars declared value of worldwide plant and animal
trade, the United States accounts for up to one third. Kosloff and Trexler, supra note 1,
at 10223.
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as the Toledo zoo panda exhibition' helps to create a climate of
intolerance for infractions of the laws regulating wildlife trade. Increased
enforcement by United States courts at least strengthens one link in the
chain of wildlife law enforcement, even if other weak links remain.
133. World Wildlife Fund v. Hodel, No. 88-1267, 1988 WL 66193 (D.D.C. 1988); see
also supra text accompanying notes 73-89 (elaborating on the facts, holding, and potential
ramifications of World Wildlife Fund).
19931
